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Note
Telecommuting and the Americans with Disabilities
Act: Is Working at Home a Reasonable
Accommodation?
Kristen M. Ludgate*
Patricia Langon, who suffers from multiple sclerosis,
worked for the Department of Health and Human Services
(H S) as a computer programmer.1 Although she adequately
performed her job for over a year and a half, Langon eventually
developed symptoms that interfered with her work.2 At first,
Langon attempted to adjust to her deteriorating condition by
altering her work schedule, having her sister drive her to the
office, and taking extended unpaid leaves where necessary to
recuperate.' When her bouts of weakness and fatigue became
more severe, however, Langon and her physician concluded she
could no longer regularly commute to work.4
On the advice of her physician,' Langon asked HHS for
permission to work from home.6 HHS denied her request, con-
tending that Langon's job required her physical presence in the
* J.D. Candidate 1998, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1985,
Bowdoin College.
1. Langon v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 959 F.2d 1053,
1054 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
2. Id.
3. Id. H-IS initially supported these efforts, even though Langon's fre-
quent absences were disruptive. Id.
4. Id. at 1054-55. Langon believed commuting to work contributed to
her deteriorating condition. Id. at 1054. In a letter to HHS, Langon's physi-
cian agreed, stating that her condition was so serious that "daily commuting
to the job will rapidly and severely threaten her health." Id. at 1055.
5. Langon's physician advocated telecommuting because it would allow
Langon to work full-time without jeopardizing her health. Id.
6. Id. at 1054. Langon also requested several other accommodations,
including the opportunity to rest during the day and a more comfortable work
environment; the agency granted these requests. Id. at 1055.
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workplace.7 Eventually, HHS terminated Langon for unsatisfac-
tory performance.8 After exhausting a series of administrative
remedies, 9 Langon filed suit in federal district court 0 under the
Rehabilitation Act (Rehab Act),11 which prohibits disability dis-
crimination by recipients of federal funds. 2  Langon argued
that the Rehab Act required HHS to allow her to work from
home as a reasonable accommodation for her multiple sclero-
sis. 3 The district court disagreed, however, and granted sum-
mary judgment for HHS 114 The D.C. Circuit reversed, 15 holding
that Langon had offered sufficient proof that working at home
was a reasonable accommodation under the Rehab Act to sur-
vive summary judgment on that issue. 6
7. Id. Although initially -HS told Langon that the agency did not have
a telecommuting policy, it later conceded that it did allow severely disabled
workers to telecommute and requested additional information about Langon's
disability. Id. Langon's physician wrote to HHS and volunteered to answer
additional questions by phone, but the agency apparently never contacted
him. Id. When HS formally denied Langon's request to work at home, it
stated that the job of computer programmer was not appropriate for telecom-
muting because it required precision, tight deadlines, and ongoing communi-
cation with colleagues requesting computer reports. Id.
8. Id. at 1056. After HS denied her request to work from home and
later refused to grant her a promotion she had long sought, Langon failed to
complete any of her assignments. Id. at 1055-56.
9. Langon first filed an internal complaint with HHS alleging that the
refusal to allow her to telecommute was discriminatory. Id. at 1056. When
HS denied this complaint, Langon appealed to the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC), which sustained the agency's action. Id. The
EEOC found that allowing Langon to telecommute would unduly burden
BI-IS. Id. Langon also appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board,
which found that HHS had just cause to fire Langon. Id.
10. See Langon v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 749 F. Supp. 1,
4 (D.D.C. 1990) (evaluating Langon's request to seek review of the EEOC's
decision).
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-795 (1994).
12. See id. § 794(a) (proscribing discrimination against disabled indi-
viduals by "any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance").
13. Langon, 749 F. Supp. at 5.
14. Id. at 4. The district court found Langon had failed to prove her in-
ability to commute to work. Id. at 6.
15. Langon v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 959 F.2d 1053,
1058 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
16. Id. The court noted HHS's changing positions in the 10 years since
the agency first denied Langon's request and found that the district court
erred by agreeing with the agency's "litigating position" that Langon failed to
provide sufficient medical information to prove her need to work from home.
Id. The court noted that nothing in the Rehab Act or the regulations required
an employee to provide medical evidence. Id. Furthermore, HHS routinely
granted work-at-home requests without such evidence. Id. at 1059. Finally,
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1997] TELECOMMUTING AND THE ADA 1311
Langon arose before the employment discrimination pro-
visions of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)17 went
into effect."8 Like the Rehab Act,19 however, Title I of the
ADA20 requires employers to take affirmative steps to accom-
modate the known disabilities of their employees.2' Thus, if a
disabled employee cannot perform some job responsibilities be-
cause of his or her disability, the ADA requires that the em-
ployer attempt to make modifications or adjustments that
would enable the employee to do the job.22 Although alleged
failures to provide reasonable accommodation make up a sub-
stantial portion of ADA complaints,23 considerable confusion
remains about the scope of an employer's obligation to accom-
modate.24  In several cases decided after Langon, courts de-
the court found that HHS failed to prove its contention that Langon's job
could be completed only at the agency. Id. at 1060.
17. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (1994)).
18. See id. § 108, 104 Stat. at 337 (noting that the ADA's employment dis-
crimination provisions were not fully effective until 1992).
19. Although the duty to reasonably accommodate is not explicit in the
statutory text, it is clearly stated in the accompanying regulations. See 45
C.F.R. § 84.12 (1996) (imposing a reasonable accommodation requirement).
20. Title I contains the ADA's employment discrimination provisions. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994) (containing the statutory provisions of Title
I); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12102 (1994) (outlining the findings, purpose
and definitions for the ADA, which are important for interpreting Title I); 29
C.F.R. § 1630 (1996) (listing regulations implementing Title I and providing
an interpretive appendix).
2L See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)-(B) (defining unlawful discrimination to
include the failure or refusal to reasonably accommodate a disabled applicant
or employee); see also 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (1996) (explaining that "[t]he obli-
gation to make reasonable accommodation is a form of non-discrimination").
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (providing examples of reasonable accommo-
dations); see also infra notes 49-58 and accompanying text (describing poten-
tial accommodations).
23. From 1992 to 1995, over 50,000 ADA complaints were filed with the
EEOC. See James H. Coil 1H & Lori J. Shapiro, The ADA at Three Years: A
Statute in Flux, 21 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 5, 5 (1996). One-quarter of the com-
plainants alleged a failure or refusal to provide reasonable accommodation.
Id.
24. Several commentators have criticized the reasonable accommodation
provisions of the ADA as unduly ambiguous and unworkable. See, e.g., Gerald
T. Holtzman et al., Reasonable Accommodation of the Disabled Worker-A Jobfor the Man or a Man for the Job?, 44 BAYLOR L. REV. 279, 279 (1992)(predicting that the ADA will be "a source of new litigation worries and a po-
tential compliance nightmare for large and small businesses alike"); Floyd D.
Weatherspoon, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: Title I and Its
Impact on Employment Decisions, 16 VT. L. REV. 263, 282 (1991) (concluding
that ADA compliance is challenging because "it is difficult to identify what
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clined to hold that an employer was obligated to allow a dis-
abled employee to work from home.25
This Note considers whether and when telecommuting is a
reasonable accommodation under the ADA. For the purposes
of this Note, the term telecommuting refers to any work-at-
home arrangement that is facilitated at least in part by tele-
communications technology.26 Because of the advantages it of-
fers to employers2 and employees,2 telecommuting has become
increasingly prevalent in the American workplace.29 Given the
trend toward telecommuting and the increasing litigation of
disability discrimination claims resulting from the passage of
the ADA,30 requests by disabled employees to telecommute are
likely to increase.
This Note argues that courts considering telecommuting as
a reasonable accommodation must use a fact-specific analysis
to determine whether telecommuting is reasonable under the
circumstances of a particular case. Part I outlines the ADA
provisions defining an employer's obligation to accommodate
disabled employees and describes the trend toward telecom-
muting in the United States. Part I also examines case law
relevant to the ADA and telecommuting. Part II argues that
current judicial approaches to telecommuting as a reasonable
accommodation are flawed because courts have presumed tele-
commuting is inappropriate. As a result, courts have failed to
adhere to the ADA's requirement of case-by-case adjudication.
Part Ill describes a fact-specific framework for evaluating
constitutes reasonable accommodation and what sufficiently establishes un-
due hardship").
25. See infra notes 104-134 and accompanying text (summarizing cases
holding against an employee who wanted to work from home).
26. See P.L. Mokhtarian & I. Solomon, Modeling the Choice of Telecom-
muting: Setting the Context, 20 ENV'T & PLANNING 749, 749 (1994) (defining
telecommuting as "using telecommunications technology to work at home...
during regular work hours, instead of commuting to a conventional work place
at the conventional time").
27. See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (outlining the advan-
tages of telecommuting for employers).
28. See infra note 79 and accompanying text (describing advantages to
employees).
29. See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (discussing the increas-
ing prevalence of telecommuting).
30. Since Title I went into effect in 1992, the EEOC has been deluged
with ADA complaints. See Coil & Shapiro, supra note 23, at 5 (noting that the
EEOC received 19,750 new ADA charges during the first nine months of
1995); Lisa Stansky, Opening Doors, ABA J., Mar. 1996, at 66 (noting that
20% of all discrimination charges filed with the EEOC are ADA claims).
1312 [Vol. 81:1309
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whether telecommuting is a reasonable accommodation under
the ADA. This Note concludes that a fact-specific evaluation of
telecommuting as a reasonable accommodation best achieves
the purposes of the ADA by maximizing employment opportu-
nities for disabled workers without unduly burdening employ-
ers.
I. THE ADA AND TELECOMMUTING: EVOLVING
OBLIGATIONS IN A CHANGING WORKPLACE
Because telecommuting challenges traditional notions of
how work is structured, it poses unique questions for the de-
velopment of employment law.3" The issue of telecommuting as
a reasonable accommodation has forced courts to articulate the
boundaries of an employer's obligations under the ADA.
Courts faced with the issue have not yet settled on a consistent
approach.33
A. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
1. Comprehensive Protection for Qualified Individuals
Congress enacted the ADA to provide a comprehensive
program that would end discrimination against disabled indi-
viduals and bring persons with disabilities into the economic
and social mainstream. 4 Prior to the passage of the ADA, dis-
crimination against individuals with disabilities was regulated
primarily by the Rehab Act, which applies only to federal em-
ployers and contractors. 35 Congress derived the ADA's employ-
ment discrimination provisions from Rehab Act regulations 36
31. See Barry A. Hartstein & Mark L. Schulman, Telecommuting: The New
Workplace of the '90s, 21 EMPLoYEE REL. L.J. 179, 180-87 (1996) (describing the
implications of telecommuting for employment law).
32. See infra Part LC (describing the reasoning of courts addressing the
telecommuting issue).
33. See infra Part I.C (comparing judicial approaches to telecommuting).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994) (declaring that the ADA's purpose
is "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination
of discrimination against individuals with disabilities"); H.R. REP. No. 101-
485, pt. 2, at 22 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.N. 344 (explaining that
the purpose of the ADA is "to bring persons with disabilities into the economic
and social mainstream of American life").
35. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-795 (1994).
36. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 62-67, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
344, 349-50 (acknowledging that the ADA's definition of "reasonable accom-
modation" is based on interpretations of that phrase under the Rehab Act).
13131997]
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that outline the duty to provide reasonable accommodation.37
Unlike the Rehab Act, however, Congress gave statutory
authority to the duty, by including it in the text of the ADA.3
The ADA also applies to both public and private employers. 39
Despite these differences, courts generally view existing Rehab
Act precedent as persuasive in ADA cases.4 °
While the ADA's protections are comprehensive, they are
available only to qualified individuals with a disability.41 Title
I defines a "qualified individual" as one who "with or without
reasonable accommodation ... can perform the essential func-
tions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires."42 Thus, the ADA's conception of a qualified individual
is directly related to the reasonable accommodation require-
ment. Determining whether a particular job function is essen-
tial requires a factual analysis 43 that focuses on whether the
Congress amended the Rehab Act in 1992 so that the standards for proving
employment discrimination under the Rehab Act are the same as those ap-
plied under the ADA. See Pub. L. No. 102-569, § 506, 106 Stat. 4344, 4428
(1992) (clarifying applicable interpretive standards).
37. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.12 (1996) (requiring that recipients of federal fi-
nancial assistance reasonably accommodate disabled employees).
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A)-(B) (1994) (defining unlawful discrimina-
tion under the ADA to include the failure or refusal to provide reasonable ac-
commodation). The text of the Rehab Act, however, does not explicitly create
an affirmative duty for employers to accommodate disabled workers. See 29
U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994) (providing only that disabled individuals should not be
excluded from federally funded programs). But see supra note 37 (explaining
that Rehab Act regulations do impose an affirmative duty on employers).
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (defining "covered entities" as employers
with 15 or more employees).
40. See, e.g., Allison v. Department of Corrections, 94 F.3d 494, 497 (8th
Cir. 1996) (recognizing that "[blecause the same basic standards and defini-
tions are used under both Acts, cases interpreting either are applicable and
interchangeable"); Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538,
542 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that the Rehab Act precedent is persuasive be-
cause Title I of the ADA "merely generalize[s] to the economy as a whole the
duties, including that of reasonable accommodation, that the regulations un-
der the Rehabilitation Act impose[] on federal agencies").
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (prohibiting discrimination against a quali-
fied individual with a disability).
42. Id. § 12111(8).
43. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(n) (1996) (explaining that "twlhether a
particular function is essential is a factual determination that must be made
on a case by case basis"). According to the EEOC, determining whether an
employee or applicant is qualified is a two-step process. Id. § 1630.2(m).
First, a court must determine whether the individual possesses the required
background and experience for the position in question. Id. Next, a court
evaluates whether the individual is able to perform, with or without reason-
able accommodations from the employer, the essential functions of the job. Id.
1314 [Vol. 81:1309
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function is so fundamental to the particular position that it
cannot be reallocated or restructured without transforming the
nature of the job.'
2. The Duty to Accommodate
The duty to take afirmative steps to accommodate dis-
abled workers distinguishes the ADA from other civil rights
laws that only mandate equality of treatment. 5 Neither the
statute nor the regulations promulgated by the Equal Em-
44. See id. § 1630.2(n)(1) (defining essential functions as "the fundamen-
tal job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds
or desires"). According to the EEOC, the essential functions inquiry usually
focuses on three issues: whether the employer actually requires all individuals
in the position to perform the function, whether other employees could per-
form the function if the plaintiffs job was restructured, and the degree of ex-
pertise required to perform the function. Id.
Courts must consider the employer's opinion about whether a particular
function is essential. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (mandating that "consideration
shall be given to the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are es-
sential"). Although the employer's opinion is not dispositive, a court's essen-
tial function inquiry should not attempt to "second guess an employers busi-
ness judgments." 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(n).
45. As the Fifth Circuit explained, unlike under civil rights laws "an em-
ployer who treats a disabled employee the same as a non-disabled employee
may violate the ADA." Reil v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 99 F.3d 678, 681
(5th Cir. 1996); see also Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabili-
ties Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second Generation Civil Rights Stat-
ute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 493-522 (1991) (comparing the ADA with
other civil rights laws).
Like other civil rights legislation, the ADA's aim is equal opportunity.
Congress designed the reasonable accommodation provisions of the ADA to
reduce or eliminate unnecessary barriers between an individual's abilities and
the requirements for performing essential job fumctions. See, e.g., H.R. REP.
No. 101-485, at 65, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 344, 350 (explaining that
"the reasonable accommodation requirement is best understood as a process
in which barriers to a particular individual's equal employment opportunity
are removed"). A reasonable accommodation provides a disabled employee
with the opportunity to attain the same level of performance as a similarly
situated non-disabled person. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (stating that a rea-
sonable accommodation should provide equal employment opportunity, de-
fined as "an opportunity to attain the same level of performance, or to enjoy
the same level of benefits and privileges of employment as are available to the
average similarly situated employee without a disability"). Equality of oppor-
tunity for disabled individuals can only be achieved, however, by providing
disabled workers with accommodations not available to their non-disabled
colleagues. See Burgdorf, supra, at 460-61 (explaining the United States
Commission on Civil Rights' finding that "[dliscrimination against handi-
capped people cannot be eliminated if programs, activities, and tasks are al-
ways structured in the ways people with normal' physical and mental abilities
customarily undertake them).
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ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), however, requires
any particular accommodation. 6 The ADA does not even pro-
vide an explicit definition of the term "reasonable accommoda-
tion" but, instead, lists the kinds of modifications that may be
required.
The EEOC regulations are similarly open-ended. The
regulations require employers and employees to engage in an
interactive process in order to determine the appropriate rea-
sonable accommodation for their situation.48  An appropriate
accommodation is one that accounts for the abilities and limi-
tations of the disabled applicant or employee and the specific
functional requirements of the job in question.49 An employer
is not required to implement an accommodation that involves
restructuring the essential functions of the position, or that
does not enable the employee to adequately perform these
functions. °
The ADA provides that reasonable accommodations may
include making facilities accessible, restructuring work sched-
46. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (explaining that the EEOC's listing of
accommodation possibilities is not intended to be exhaustive).
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(A)-(B) (listing accommodations which the
term "reasonable accommodation" may encompass).
48. The interpretative appendix to the EEOC regulations places consider-
able emphasis on the procedural aspects of Title I. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630
(explaining that the ADA "establishes a process in which the employer must
assess a disabled individual's ability to perform"); id. § 1630.2(o) (stating that
finding an appropriate accommodation "involves a process in which the em-
ployer and employee identify the precise limitations imposed by the disability
and explore potential accommodations"); id. § 1630.9(a) (describing a four-step
process employers should use when an employee requests an accommodation).
The regulations do not specify, however, what happens when the process
breaks down. The Seventh Circuit has held that where there is a failure of
communication, "courts should attempt to isolate the cause of the breakdown
and then assign responsibility." Beck v. University of Wis., 75 F.3d 1130,
1135 (7th Cir. 1996). The Beck court held that an employer is not liable for
failure to provide accommodations when the employee is the one who caused
the process of identifying an accommodation to break down. Id. at 1137. In a
subsequent case, the Seventh Circuit found that an employer's failure to par-
ticipate in the required interactive process precluded summary judgment for
the employer. Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Community Sch., 100 F.3d 1281,
1287 (7th Cir. 1996).
49. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (explaining that the reasonable accommo-
dation process requires the assessment of both the job and the individual's
disability).
50. See id. § 1630.2(o) (explaining that "the essential functions are by
definition those that the individual who holds the job would have to perform");
see also supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (describing essential job
functions).
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ules and responsibilities, or adapting examinations and other
training and selection tools."1 ' Accommodations upheld by
courts under the Rehab Act and the ADA include requiring a
school to provide an assistant for a teacher who was disabled in
a car accident, 2 restructuring a chemist's duties to minimize
his contact with the public,53 reassigning an employee to a va-
cant alternative position,54 and transferring an employee to a
location where he can obtain better medical care.55  Other
courts have interpreted the reasonable accommodation re-
quirement more narrowly, denying requests for a modified
work schedule,5 6 prolonged leaves to accommodate chronic ill-
ness, 57 and a smoke-free work environment.5 8
3. The Undue Hardship Defense
An employer may avoid accommodating a disabled employee
or applicant by demonstrating that the proposed accommodation
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (noting accommodations which the term
"reasonable accommodation" may include). This list "is not intended to be ex-
haustive of accommodation possibilities." 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o). The in-
terpretive appendix to the regulations also mentions, as other possible ac-
commodations, providing additional leave, providing personal assistants, or
reallocating or restructuring nonessential job functions. Id.
52. See Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 142 (2d Cir.
1995) (holding that a school district may be required to provide a teaching as-
sistant to a disabled teacher).
53. See Overton v. Reilly, 977 F.2d 1190, 1195 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding
that an employer could have accommodated a plaintiffs inability to interact
with the public by allowing the plaintiff to communicate by mail and providing
him with someone who could speak on the phone for him).
54. See Benson v. Northwest Airlines, 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir. 1995)
(noting that reassignment to an alternative position was a possible accommo-
dation where the plaintiff presented evidence that positions were vacant and
that he was qualified for them).
55. See Buckingham v. United States, 998 F.2d 735, 740 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that an HIV-positive plaintiffs request to transfer for access to better
medical treatment was not unreasonable as a matter of law).
56. See Guice-Mills v. Derwinski, 967 F.2d 794, 798 (2d Cir. 1992) (refusing
to require an employer to allow a head nurse to begin her shift two hours late
as an accommodation for severe depression because communication with the
night supervisor was essential to her position).
57. See, e.g., Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that
an employer was not required to grant indefinite leave so that a bus driver
suffering from chronic illnesses could improve his health).
58. See Harmer v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 831 F. Supp. 1300, 1306
(E.D. Va. 1993) (holding that an employee was not entitled to a completely
smoke-free environment as an accommodation to a pulmonary disability
where the employer limited smoking to designated areas).
1997] 1317
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would impose an undue hardship on its operation.5 9 An undue
hardship exists when a proposed accommodation creates "sig-
nificant difficulty or expense"60 for the employer. Determining
whether an accommodation presents an undue hardship re-
quires a fact-specific analysis of the costs and logistical diffi-
culties imposed on the employer's resources.6 1 If a particular
accommodation poses an undue hardship, the employer must
attempt to provide a less burdensome alternative accommoda-
tion.62
The requirements for establishing an undue hardship de-
fense are ambiguous, because neither Congress nor the EEOC
have promulgated specific guidelines that distinguish a rea-
sonable accommodation from an undue hardship.63 This uncer-
tainty forces courts to make fact-specific determinations in in-
dividual cases. While this ambiguity increases litigation, the
EEOC argues that a fact-specific approach "is essential if
qualified individuals of varying abilities are to receive equal
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994) (defining discrimination to in-
clude the failure to make reasonable accommodation, "unless such covered
entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hard-
ship on the operation of the business") (emphasis added). An employer may
avoid a particular accommodation on undue hardship grounds even if the pro-
posed accommodation would allow the employee to do the job. See, e.g., 29
C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(p) (1996) (explaining that although bright lighting might
enable a visually impaired waiter to work in a nightclub, this accommodation
would impose an undue hardship if it would destroy the club's ambiance or
make it difficult for patrons to see the stage).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A).
61. See id. § 12111(10)(B) (listing several factors to be considered in de-
termining whether a proposed accommodation presents an undue hardship,
all of which focus on the cost and nature of the accommodation, relative to the
resources and structure of the entity in question); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(p)(stating that the undue hardship inquiry should account for the financial re-
alities of the particular employer).
62. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(p) (explaining that if one accommodation
presents an undue hardship, an employer is required to provide an alternative
accommodation if one is available).
63. One commentator argues that Congress had specific reasons for refus-
ing to clearly define the undue hardship defense. Steven B. Epstein, In
Search of a Bright Line: Determining When an Employer's Financial Hardship
Becomes "Undue" Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 48 VAND. L.
REV. 391, 427 (1995). Epstein suggests that Congress implemented a vague
standard because (1) it expected the costs of reasonable accommodations
would be insignificant; (2) it believed cases decided under the Rehab Act pro-
vided ample interpretive guidance; (3) it concluded that courts could interpret
any ambiguities on a case-by-case basis; and (4) it decided that coming up
with a fixed standard would be impossible, given the enormous range of dis-
abilities and employment settings. Id.
1318 [Vol. 81:1309
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opportunities to compete for an infinitely diverse range of
jobs."'
4. Burdens of Proof in a Reasonable Accommodation Case
Neither the text of the ADA nor the.EEOC regulations al-
locate the burdens of proof between employer and employee for
violations of Title I, creating considerable confusion about what
is required to prove a prima facie case under the available
theories of discrimination. 65 Despite the lack of specific guide-
lines, courts have developed a relatively consistent framework
for evaluating reasonable accommodation cases. Typically, the
employee must establish that he or she is disabled66 and quali-
fied to perform the essential functions of the job with a pro-
posed reasonable accommodation.67 Conversely, the employer
bears the burden of proving that any contested job criteria are
genuinely essential.68 The burden of proving undue hardship
also rests with the employer.6 9
64. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.
65. For a detailed summary of possible theories of employment discrimi-
nation under the ADA and their corresponding burdens of proof, see Monette v.
Electronic Data Systems Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1179-86 (6th Cir. 1996) (examining
alternative burdens of proof and arguing that the appropriate model should
depend on the nature of the plaintiffs claim). See also Paul S. Greenlaw &
John P. Kohl, Proving ADA Discrimination: The Court's View, 47 LAB. L.J.
376, 376-80 (1996) (comparing burdens of proof under Title VII and the ADA).
66. See, e.g., Monette, 90 F.3d at 1185 (requiring plaintiffs to prove they
are disabled as part of their prima facie case); Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d
26, 30-32 (1st Cir. 1996) (providing an extended analysis of the requirements
for proving disability under the 'ADA); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994)
(defining "disability" under the ADA).
67. See, e.g., Monette, 90 F.3d at 1183-84 (explaining that the plaintiff
bears the burden of establishing "that he or she is capable of performing the
essential functions of the job with the proposed accommodation"); Katz, 87
F.3d at 30 (explaining that an element of the plaintiffs case is to show the
ability to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable
accommodation); Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs., 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir.
1994) (holding that the "[pilaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that she
could perform the essential functions of her job with reasonable accommoda-
tion"); Hendry v. GTE North, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 816, 825 (N.D. Ind. 1995)
(holding that the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that he or she is a
qualified individual with a disability and, thus, plaintiff bears the burden of
demonstrating that he or she could perform the essential functions of the job
with reasonable accommodation); Dutton v. Johnson County Bd. of County
Comm'rs, 859 F. Supp. 498, 506 (D. Kan. 1994) (explaining that the "plaintiff
must prove that he is a 'qualified individual").
68. See, e.g., Monette, 90 F.3d at 1185 (explaining that "[tlhe employer
will bear the burden of proving that a challenged job criterion is essential");
Reil v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 99 F.3d 678, 683 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting
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A plaintiff challenging the failure or refusal to provide
reasonable accommodation must propose an accommodation
as part of the prima facie case in order to demonstrate his or
her qualifications for the position.70 In addition to allowing
the plaintiff to perform the job, the proposed accommodation
must be facially reasonable.7 1 Unlike the undue hardship in-
quiry, which focuses only on the defendant's resources,7 2 de-
termining whether an accommodation is facially reasonable
requires a factual analysis "untethered to the defendant em-
ployer's particularized situation. 73 Courts have held that an
accommodation is facially reasonable if it would be reason-
able for a similar employer,74 if the costs do not appear to
that the employer failed to prove that meeting deadlines was essential to the
plaintiffs job); Dutton, 859 F. Supp. at 508-09 (denying summary judgment to
the defendant because the defendant failed to prove regular attendance was
an essential function).
69. See, e.g., Monette, 90 F.3d at 1186 (explaining that the burden of
proving undue hardship rests with the employer); Rel, 99 F.3d at 682 (noting
that the employer may avoid accommodating a plaintiff if the employer shows
undue hardship); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th
Cir. 1995) (stating that the employer must prove that it is unable to accom-
modate the employee without undue hardship).
70. See, e.g., Monette, 90 F.3d at 1183 (holding that "the disabled individ-
ual bears the initial burden of proposing an accommodation"); Reil, 99 F.3d at
683 (holding that the proposal of a reasonable accommodation is an element of
the plaintiffs prima facie case); Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44
F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that the plaintiff must propose an ac-
commodation that is reasonable with respect to efficacy and cost); Willett v.
Kansas, 942 F. Supp. 1387, 1393 (D. Kan. 1996) (holding that a plaintiff is re-
quired to suggest possible accommodations).
71. See, e.g., Monette, 90 F.3d at 1183 (holding that an accommodation
must be "objectively reasonable" apart from the employers particular situa-
tion); Reil, 99 F.3d at 683 (explaining that a plaintiff bears the burden of
proving reasonableness); Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 542 (arguing that the term
"reasonable" qualifies the term "accommodation," such that an accommoda-
tion may be unreasonable even if it does not impose an undue hardship).
72. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text (describing factors con-
sidered as part of an undue hardship inquiry).
73. Monette, 90 F.3d at 1183-84 n.10 (explaining that "[oince a determi-
nation is made that a proposed accommodation is. . . 'generally' reasonable,
the defendant employer then bears the burden of showing that the accommo-
dation imposes an undue hardship upon it, given the employer's specific
situation").
74. See, e.g., Reil, 99 F.3d at 683 (explaining that a reasonable accommo-
dation is one which is "reasonable in the run of cases") (quoting Barth v. Gelb,
2 F.3d 1180, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
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outweigh the benefits," or if it appears appropriate in view of
industry standards. 76
B. THE TREND TOWARD TELECOMMUTING
While most employees travel to their employer's facilities
to work, evolving information technologies7 7 are enabling more
and more people to work effectively from home.7' Telecommut-
ing is an attractive option for employees because it often pro-
vides increased flexibility and greater control over the employ-
ees' work environment.7 9 Benefits to employers include savings
on office overhead,0 lower employee absenteeism,81 increased
75. See, e.g., Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 543 (holding that the cost of a
plaintiffs proposed accommodation must be considered with respect to both
efficacy and proportionality).
76. See Monette, 90 F.3d at 1183 n.10 (noting that one way a plaintiff can
demonstrate reasonableness is to offer proof that similar accommodations are
provided by similar employers).
77. See JACK M. NILLES, MAKING TELEcOMMuIING HAPPEN 2 (1994)
(explaining that as workers increasingly use telephones, computers and other
technologies to do their work, they are more able to work in different loca-
tions); m ESOTA DEPT OF TRANsP., A REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA LEG-
ISLATURE ON TELECOMMUTING IN THE TWIN CITIES METROPOLITAN AREA 3-4
(1994) (summarizing the proliferation of affordable technology that has expe-
dited the trend toward telecommuting) [hereinafter TCMA REPORT].
78. Reliable estimates of the number of telecommuters are difficult to ob-
tain because of the wide variety of work-at-home arrangements. See Cheryl
Russell, How Many Home Workers?, AM. DEMOGRAPmics, May 1996, at 6
(discussing the difficulties of measuring the increasing popularity of telecom-
muting). One survey estimates that 9 million Americans telecommuted at
least part of the time in 1994, and predicts this number could reach 13 million
by 1998. Allan H. Weitzman & Kathleen M. McKenna, Legal Complications
Affect Trend Toward Telecommuting, EMPLOYMENT L. STRATEGIST, June
1996, at 1. Another suggests the number of telecommuting employees could
reach 15 million by 2002. TCMA REPORT, supra note 77, at 10 (citing U.S.
DEP'T OF TRANSP., TRANSPORTATION IMPLICATIONS OF TELECOMMUTING 59
(1993)). Most experts agree that the number of telecommuters continues to
increase, perhaps by as much as 15% per year. See George M. Piskurich,
Making Telecommuting Work, TRAINING & DEV., Feb. 1996, at 20, 22 (describing
the predicted increase in telecommuting).
79. See Piskurich, supra note 78, at 22 (listing advantages of telecommut-
ing for employees). Additional advantages to employees include avoiding the
costs and stresses of commuting, reducing expenses for work attire, and easier
management of child care arrangements. See TCMA REPORT, supra note 77,
at 7-8 (listing the benefits of telecommuting from both management and em-
ployee perspectives).
80. See NILLES, supra note 77, at 141 (estimating that organizations with
significant numbers of telecommuters can achieve reductions of up to 33% in
office space); Increased Productivity Found Among Employees Who Telecom-
mute, 1995 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 205, at D10 (Oct. 24, 1995) (noting that in
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productivity,82 improved employee morale, 3 and higher em-
ployee retention.84 Telecommuting also provides significant
public policy benefits,85 including reduced traffic congestion,
86
air pollution,87 and energy consumption. 88
Despite the advantages of telecommuting, several disad-
vantages limit its use by employers. Full-time telecommuting
is not suited to jobs where face-to-face contact with colleagues
or clients is essential to the position. 89  Telecommuting also
1994, 35,000 AT&T managers telecommuted, resulting in an $80 million re-
duction in real estate costs) [hereinafter Increased Productivity].
81. See NILLES, supra note 77, at 140 (estimating that telecommuters will
take two less sick days per year); TCMA REPORT, supra note 77, at 7 (reporting
that studies of telecommuters show reduced use of sick leave).
82. See Increased Productivity, supra note 80, at D1O (discussing General
Services Administration estimate that telecommuting employees are 20%
more productive); Piskurich, supra note 78, at 22 (reporting that telecommut-
ers are 16% more efficient than their in-office counterparts).
83. See TCMA REPORT, supra note 77, at 7 (reporting that studies of tele-
commuters show increased employee morale and motivation).
84. See NILLES, supra note 77, at 141 (reporting that 74% of respondents
in his study who considered quitting their jobs cited the ability to telecom-
mute as a substantial influence on their decision to stay).
85. Several states and the federal government have taken actions to pro-
mote telecommuting. See PAMELA MARTIN, LEGIS. REFERENCE BUREAU
(Hawaii), TELECOMMUTING: THE RIDE OF THE FUTURE 34-37 (1992) (sum-
marizing state and local telecommuting initiatives); Hartstein & Schulman, su-
pra note 31, at 179 (noting that 60,000 federal jobs are slated for telecommut-
ing by 1998).
86. See TCMA REPORT, supra note 77, at ii-iii (finding that in the Twin
Cities in 1994, telecommuting was estimated to reduce commuter travel by
6.2% during the morning and evening rush hours, and that under the most
optimistic projection telecommuting could reduce Twin Cities commuter
travel by 21% by 2003); Patricia L. Mokhtarian, Telecommuting and Travel:
State of the Practice, State of the Art, 18 TRANSP. 319, 336-39 (1991)
(analyzing a number of studies that examine the relationship between tele-
commuting and individual travel behavior and finding that the overall trip-
taking of telecommuters tends to decrease).
87. Determining the potential of telecommuting to reduce air pollution is
complicated by the uncertain relationship between decreased traffic and de-
creased vehicle emissions. See TCMA REPORT, supra note 77, at 20-21
(summarizing possible air quality impacts of telecommuting); Mokhtarian, su-
pra note 86, at 332-33 (concluding that reduced commuting should result in
decreased vehicle emissions, but also noting that this effect may be smaller
than commonly assumed).
88. See PHILLIP E. MAHFOOD, HOMEWORKm HOW TO HIRE, MANAGE &
MONITOR EMPLOYEES WHO WORK AT HOME 16-17, 27-28 (1992) (arguing that
telecommuting reduces energy consumption and dependence on foreign oil);
NILLES, supra note 77, at 142-43 (explaining that decreases in traffic conges-
tion and vehicle use also result in decreased energy consumption).
89. See NILLES, supra note 77, at 27 (listing a sample of telecommutable
jobs); Daniel B. Rathbone, Telecommuting in the United States, ITE J., Dec.
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poses a variety of management challenges,9° from figuring out
a systematic mode of communication to developing new ways to
assess employee performance.91 Even an otherwise successful
telecommuting program may decrease flexibility in a crisis, be-
cause fewer employees are at the workplace to deal with emer-
gencies.92
Telecommuting is also not appropriate for every worker.
Some employees lack the independence and commitment re-
quired of successful telecommuters, 93 while others prefer
working with colleagues in an office. 94 In addition, some tele-
commuting employees may feel isolated from colleagues95 and
1992, at 44 (estimating that 54% of the labor force is employed in information
or knowledge jobs that are appropriate for telecommuting). According to one
author:
A telecommuting job should have activities that can be measured, be
done for the most part independently, be portable to a non-office en-
vironment, have observable beginning and end points, not need spe-
cial equipment that is only at the work site, and not have deadline
requirements that come from outside the telecommuter's department.
Piskurich, supra note 78, at 24.
90. See NILLES, supra note 77, at 134-38 (describing the planning, selec-
tion, training, evaluation and administrative costs associated with implement-
ing an effective telecommuting program); Piskurich, supra note 78, at 21-25(outlining the training and administrative requirements for an effective tele-
commuting program). For a comprehensive overview of management chal-
lenges raised by telecommuting, see generally MAHFOOD, supra note 88.
91. Many managers fear they will be unable to effectively supervise tele-
commuting employees. See Maggie Murray Courtney & Lisa A. Lavelle, From
Workplace to Work Space, LEGAL TIMEs, June 10, 1996, at 831 (reporting that
"[slome managers feel very uncomfortable with their ability to supervise
workers they cannot see"); Piskurich, supra note 78, at 22-23 (noting
"[m]anagers often believe that telecommuting will cause them to lose control
of their employees, or will reduce the need for managers); Increased Produc-
tivity, supra note 80, at D10 (reporting that "[m]anager's attitudes have been
the most persistent barrier to telecommuting").
92. See Piskurich, supra note 78, at 22 (noting that decreased flexibility is
one drawback of having fewer people in the office).
93. See NILLES, supra note 77, at 27-28 (describing the ideal telecom-
muter as one "who is strongly self-motivated and self-disciplined," and who
already possesses the required skills for their position); Piskurich, supra note
78, at 25 (describing successful telecommuters as those who are committed,
responsible, task-oriented, and trustworthy).
94. See Piskurich, supra note 78, at 23 (reporting that in companies with
telecommuting programs, only 15-25% of employees will volunteer for tele-
commuting).
95. See Michael A. Verespej, Communications Technology: Slave or Mas-
ter?, INDUSTRYWrK, June 19, 1995, at 50 (noting isolation among telecommut-
ing employees).
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unable to separate their work and personal lives.96 For clerical
or blue-collar workers, telecommuting may result in lost bene-
fits rather than increased flexibility.97
Proponents of telecommuting argue that work-at-home ar-
rangements facilitate improved employment opportunities for
disabled individuals. 98 Some advocates for the disabled, how-
ever, are less enthusiastic. These critics fear that the expan-
sion of telecommuting will result in the segregation of disabled
employees from the mainstream workplace, cautioning that
disabled employees should never be forced to telecommute. 99
C. TELECOMMUTING AS A REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION:
JUDICIAL APPROACHES
1. The Excessive Absenteeism Cases: Presence as an
Essential Function
Some courts considering telecommuting cases have looked
to cases addressing excessive absenteeism to support a pre-
sumption that telecommuting is an inappropriate accommoda-
tion. In several excessive absenteeism cases, courts evaluating
whether an employer must accommodate chronic absenteeism
have held that disabled employees are not qualified for a posi-
tion if they cannot maintain predictable attendance at work. °0°
96. See TCMA REPORT, supra note 77, at 8 (noting employees' concern
that telecommuting makes it difficult to separate work from home).
97. See Donald Tomaskovic-Devey & Barbara J. Risman, Telecommuting
Innovation and Organization: A Contingency Theory of Labor Process Change,
74 SOC. SC. Q. 367, 368 (1993) (noting that while for white collar profession-
als telecommuting may result in increased flexibility, "[c]lerical telecommut-
ing tends to be sub-contract or piece rate work done totally at home and with
the loss of benefits packages"); see also TCMA REPORT, supra note 77, at 11
(noting the implications of telecommuting for workers' rights).
98. See, e.g., MAHFOOD, supra note 88, at 14-15 (arguing that telecommut-
ing is appropriate for physically disabled individuals who are otherwise quali-
fied for meaningful work); NILLES, supra note 77, at 144 (noting that one of
the policy benefits of telecommuting is that it increases access for disabled
individuals).
99. See Courtney & Lavelle, supra note 91, at S31 (reporting that advo-
cates for the disabled fear that telecommuting may not be in the best interests
of disabled workers).
100. See, e.g., Jackson v. Veterans Admin., 22 F.3d 277, 279 (11th Cir.
1994) (holding that plaintiff was not "otherwise qualified" for his position
where he was absent on a "sporadic, unpredictable basis"); Santiago v. Temple
Univ., 739 F. Supp. 974, 979 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that a plaintiff who "has
demonstrated an apparent inability to attend work with any degree of pre-
dictability" could not be accommodated), affd, 928 F.2d 396 (3rd Cir. 1991);
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Typically, these courts support this conclusion by noting the
disruption caused to an entity's operations when an employee
is not reliably present.1 1 Many excessive absenteeism cases
contain sweeping statements declaring the necessity of work-
place attendance, often going beyond the facts of the case.10 2
These declarations have formed the basis for a presumption,
followed in some telecommuting cases, that because physical
presence at work is an essential function of employment, tele-
commuting is almost by definition an inappropriate accommo-
dation. 103
2. The Vande Zande Presumption Against Telecommuting
Excessive absenteeism cases figured prominently in Vande
Zande v. Wisconsin Department of Administration,I°4 the only
circuit case to consider whether working at home can be a rea-
Matzo v. Postmaster Gen., 685 F. Supp. 260, 263 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding that
an employee who missed several months of work was not "otherwise quali-
fied"), affd, 861 F.2d 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
10L See, e.g., Jackson, 22 F.3d at 279 (holding that requiring the employer
to accommodate the plaintiffs absences would "place upon the [employer] the
burden of making last-minute provisions for [the plaintiffs] work to be done
by someone else"); Walders v. Garrett, 765 F. Supp. 303, 309 (E.D. Va. 1991)
(holding that requiring an employer to allow an employee "to work only when
her illness permits" through manipulation of leave and attendance policies
would impose undue hardship upon the employer), affd, 956 F.2d 1163 (4th
Cir. 1992); see also Steven H. Winterbauer, Is Disability-Related Absenteeism
a Lawful Basis for Discharge Under the ADA?, 21 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 51, 53-
71 (1996) (summarizing the circumstances under which courts have permitted
discharge for disability-related absenteeism).
102. See, e.g., Larkins v. CIBA Vision Corp., 858 F. Supp. 1572, 1584 (N.D.
Ga. 1994) (stating that "regular attendance and the ability to perform work
are an essential function of any position under the Rehabilitation Act"); EEOC
v. AIC Sec. Investigation, 820 F. Supp. 1060, 1064 (N.D. MI1. 1993) (stating
that for ADA purposes "attendance is necessary to any job"); Santiago, 739 F.
Supp. at 979 (finding that "attendance is necessarily the fundamental pre-
requisite to job qualification").
For an overview of the development of the "presence is an essential func-
tion" presumption in cases dealing with excessive absenteeism, see generally
Audrey E. Smith, Comment, The "Presence Is an Essential Function" Myth:
The ADA's Trapdoor for the Chronically Ill, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 163 (1995).
103. See, e.g., Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544-
55 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing excessive absenteeism cases for the proposition that
most jobs cannot be performed from home); Whillock v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
926 F. Supp. 1555, 1564 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (citing excessive absenteeism cases to
support its conclusion that the plaintiffs request to work at home was unrea-
sonable as a matter of law), affd, 86 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 1996); Misek-Falkoff'
v. IBM, 854 F. Supp. 215, 227. (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (asserting that presence is es-
sential to most jobs), affd, 60 F.3d 811 (2d Cir. 1995).
104. 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995).
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sonable accommodation under the ADA. While Vande Zande is
frequently interpreted to have held that telecommuting is al-
most always inappropriate, 10 5 the actual holding of the case
was more narrow. Vande Zande, a paraplegic, requested to
work at home after a bout of pressure ulcers prevented her
from traveling to work for eight weeks. 10 6 Vande Zande's em-
ployer allowed her to work at home, but refused to provide her
with the computer she needed to work full time. Her employer
also required that she take paid sick leave for any hours she
was unable to work. 0 7 The Seventh Circuit held that by allow-
ing Vande Zande to work most of her hours from home and
giving her paid sick leave for the remainder, Vande Zande's
employer had reasonably accommodated her.10 8
More important to the development of telecommuting ju-
risprudence, however, is the Vande Zande court's sweeping
statement in dicta that "it would take a very extraordinary case
for the employee to be able to create a triable issue of the em-
ployer's failure to allow the employee to work at home." 10 9 In
crafting this presumption, the court noted that because most
105. Two district courts have discussed Vande Zande in addressing the ap-
propriateness of telecommuting. See Anzalone v. Allstate Ins. Co., 5 Am. Dis-
abilities Cas. (BNA) 455, 457-58 (E.D. La. Jan. 19, 1995) (distinguishing
Vande Zande and holding that telecommuting might be an appropriate ac-
commodation); Whillock, 926 F. Supp. at 1566 (relying on Vande Zande for the
proposition that telecommuting is appropriate only in rare cases).
Several commentators also have discussed the implications of Vande
Zande for telecommuting and the ADA. See, e.g., Hartstein & Schulman, su-
pra note 31, at 180-81 (recounting the Vande Zande case to describe the ADA
issue raised by telecommuting); Weitzman & McKenna, supra note 78, at 6
(explaining that Vande Zande held that employers are not generally required
to allow disabled workers to telecommute); Winterbauer, supra note 101, at 58
(describing Judge Posner as an "eloquent proponent" of the proposition that
telecommuting is generally an unreasonable accommodation).
106. Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 544.
107. Id. Vande Zande did ultimately work at home for all but 16.5 hours of
the eight-week period, taking the remaining time as sick leave. Id. She ar-
gued, however, that the ADA required her employer either to provide her with
the support she needed to work full time or to excuse her from having to use
sick leave. Id.
108. Id. at 545 ("An accommodation that allows a disabled worker to work
at home, at full pay, subject only to a slight loss of sick leave that may never
be needed, hence never missed, is, we hold, reasonable as a matter of law.").
109. Id. (emphasis added). Although the court conceded that "as to any
generalization about so complex and varied an activity as employment there
are exceptions," it concluded that under most circumstances "an employer is
not required to accommodate a disability by allowing the disabled worker to
work by himself, without supervision, at home." Id. at 544.
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jobs require teamwork, they cannot be performed at home
without a substantial reduction in productivity.11 The court
then cited two excessive absenteeism cases for the proposition
that the "majority view""1 is that an employer is generally not
required to allow a disabled worker to work from home.
A subsequent district court case, Whillock v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 112 relied heavily on Vande Zande in ruling that
even if a plaintiff could perform her job from home, her request
to do so was "unreasonable as a matter of law."' 13 Whillock re-
quested to work at home after she began experiencing severe
allergic reactions to common chemicals at work. 14 When Delta
refused her request, 15 Whillock filed suit under the ADA, al-
leging a failure to provide reasonable accommodation. 116
The Whillock court's analysis followed two alternative ap-
proaches. First, the court considered the particular facts of the
case and determined that Whillock could not adequately per-
form her duties as a reservation sales agent from home.1 17
Thus, the court held, working at home was not an appropriate
accommodation because it would not allow Whillock to perform
required job responsibilities. 118
110. Id.
111. Id. (citing Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs., Inc., 31 F.3d 209 (4th Cir.
1994) and Law v. United States Postal Serv., 852 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
112. 926 F. Supp. 1555 (N.D. Ga. 1995), affd, 86 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir.
1996).
113. Id. at 1566. The court's argument relies heavily on the Vande Zande
presumption that working at home is reasonable only in rare cases. See id. at
1565-66.
114. Id. at 1557-58. Whillock was diagnosed with Multiple Chemical Sen-
sitivity Syndrome. Id. at 1558. Although the precise nature of her condition
was disputed, id. at 1558-59, the court assumed Whillock was disabled for the
purposes of its reasonable accommodation analysis. Id. at 1563.
115. Id. at 1559.
116. Id. Although initially Whillock also contested Delta's refusal to pro-
vide disability benefits and its failure to modify her work environment, by the
time of trial she alleged that telecommuting was the only possible accommo-
dation. Id.
117. Id. at 1564. The court offered three reasons for this conclusion. First,
Delta's agents have access to classified airline information, the security of
which could not be maintained off premises. Second, agents work in a highly
supervised environment where on the job training is ongoing and essential.
Finally, providing Whillock with her own computer would be disproportion-
ately expensive, as compared with the cost of sharing a terminal with other
agents on site. Id.
118. Id. at 1565; see also supra note 50 and accompanying text (explaining
that employers are not required under the ADA to implement ineffective ac-
commodations).
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While the preceding analysis was sufficient to justify
granting Delta's motion for summary judgment," 9 the court's
second, alternative analysis was more sweeping. 120 The court
stated that even if Whillock could effectively perform her du-
ties from home, her request to do so was nonetheless "not rea-
sonable as a matter of law."121 The court did not specify how
this analysis differed from its initial reasoning, making its al-
ternative argument primarily to emphasize that it would not
be sympathetic to work-at-home requests except in highly un-
usual situations.
122
3. Presumed Unusual: The Hybrid Approach
Two other courts ruling against employees also presumed
telecommuting would be unusual, although their analyses were
more restrained than in either Vande Zande or Whillock. In
Carr v. Reno,123 the D.C. Circuit upheld an employer's refusal
to allow a disabled clerk to work from home.124  Unlike in
Vande Zande or Whillock, however, the Carr court assumed
that the Rehab Act required employers to consider telecommut-
ing as a reasonable accommodation. 12  After examining the
facts of the case, however, the court found that the plaintiffs
job required her to adhere to ongoing and inflexible deadlines
that made off-premise employment unworkable. 26 Moreover,
119. Whillock, 926 F. Supp. at 1565; see also supra note 67 and accompany-
ing text (explaining that under the ADA the plaintiff bears the burden of
proving whether she is qualified for the job with the proposed accommoda-
tion).
120. The court sets this alternative analysis apart from its previous in-
quiry, under the heading "Plaintiffs Suggested Accommodation is Unreason-
able as a Matter of Law." Whillock, 926 F. Supp at 1565.
121. Id. at 1566.
122. It is difficult to determine the extent to which the court thought its
alternative holding was genuinely compelled by law since the court conceded
that working at home might be a reasonable accommodation in "a very ex-
traordinary case." Id.
123. 23 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
124. Id. at 530. Carr was discharged from her position as a coding clerk
because of prolonged and unpredictable absenteeism, and contested her ter-
mination under the Rehab Act. Id. at 527-28.
125. Id. at 530 (noting that the Rehab Act, which "demands a great deal
from federal employers," requires an organization to consider telecommuting
as a potential accommodation).
126. Carr conceded that she was unable to meet the agency's deadlines by
working from home. Id. Furthermore, the court held, her employer demon-
strated that its daily four o'clock deadlines made flexible scheduling an undue
hardship. Id.
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the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she could maintain
predictable performance by working at home, and thus could
not prove her qualifications for the job. 27
A more recent district court case, Misek-Falkoff v. IBM,28
used a similar fact-based approach. The court found that tele-
commuting was an inappropriate accommodation because an
essential function of the plaintiffs job as a systems analyst was
attending meetings and collaborating face-to-face with col-
leagues. 129 In holding for the employer, the court emphasized
that its conclusion rested not on a presumption against tele-
commuting,13 but on the specific functional requirements of
Misek-Falkoff's job and the nature of her disability. 131
Although the Carr and Misek-Falkoff courts avoided the
explicit presumption against telecommuting applied in Vande
Zande and Whillock,132 they still assumed telecommuting
would rarely be appropriate. The Carr court remarked in
passing that predictable performance can be achieved from
home only in "the unusual case."133  Likewise, the court in
Misek-Falkoff cited an excessive absenteeism case for the
proposition that "predictable attendance is fundamental to
most jobs."134 Thus, underlying each court's decision is an as-
sumption that telecommuting is a disfavored accommodation,
127. Id. The district court found that Carr's attendance "was so erratic as
to make her unqualified for any position." Id. The D.C. Circuit agreed, noting
that Carr failed to demonstrate that by telecommuting she could fulfill even
minimal expectations of regular job performance. Id.
128. 854 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), affd, 60 F.3d 811 (2d Cir. 1995).
129. Id. at 227. The plaintiff requested to work at home when she began
experiencing bouts of rage and irrationality, allegedly as a result of a neuro-
logical disorder. Id. at 218. These outbursts made it impossible for the plain-
tiff to work effectively with others. Id.
130. Id. at 227 (explaining that "[wjhat is most significant... is not ab-
sences as such, but whether or not the job is completed in a timely manner").
131. Id. at 226-27. The court found that presence was essential to Misek-
Falkoff's job so that she could test new systems with other employees in a
timely manner and attend training sessions and other meetings. Id. Since
plaintiffs disability made her unable to interact with others, however, the
court held that no accommodation was possible. Id. at 228.
132. Indeed, the Carr court explicitly states that the essential function of
attendance at work can be achieved at home in some cases. Carr, 23 F.3d at
530. Likewise, in Misek-Falkoff, the court emphasizes that performance,
rather than presence per se, is significant. Misek-Falkoff, 854 F. Supp. at 227.
133. Carr, 23 F.3d at 530.
134. Misek-Falkoff, 854 F. Supp. at 227 (citing Walders v. Garrett, 765 F.
Supp. 303, 310 (E.D. Va. 1991)).
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although their analyses also contain some elements of a factual
approach.
4. Telecommuting as a Plausible Accommodation: A Fact-
Specific Alternative
Two courts have used a fact-specific approach to examine
the issue of telecommuting as a reasonable accommodation,
finding it plausible. In Langon v. Department of Health &
Human Services,'35 the plaintiff, a computer programmer, sur-
vived a summary judgment motion on the issue of the reason-
ableness of telecommuting. 136 The court concluded that sum-
mary judgment was inappropriate because Langon presented
sufficient evidence that her job could be completed from
home. 137 The court also noted that the employer had an exist-
ing work-at-home policy, indicating that telecommuting was
not facially unreasonable. 138
A more recent district court case, Anzalone v. Allstate In-
surance Co.,139 used a similar approach to deny summary
judgment to an employer who refused to allow a claims ad-
juster to work from home. 4 ° In denying the motion, the court
noted that most of the plaintiffs job functions were ordinarily
conducted outside the office. 141 Furthermore, there was no evi-
dence that the plaintiffs productivity declined when he worked
from home. 42 The court also noted that Allstate allowed other
135. 959 F.2d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The Langon case is also discussed su-
pra in the introduction to this Note.
136. Id. at 1061.
137. Id. at 1060-61. HHS contended that telecommuting was inappropri-
ate because the plaintiffs job had tight deadlines and required frequent col-
laboration with colleagues. Id. at 1060. Langon disagreed, and the court held
that her deposition was sufficient to put the issue in dispute. Id. In articulat-
ing the relevant standard for summary judgment, the court noted that HHS
failed to prove either that Langon's job could be completed only at the agency
or that telecommuting would impose an undue hardship. Id. at 1057.
138. Id. at 1055.
139. 5 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 455 (E.D. La. Jan. 19, 1995). Anzalone
injured his back when he fell from a roof. He returned to work for eight days,
but later resigned when office work aggravated his back and the company
denied his request to work from the field. Id. at 455-56. Several months
later, Anzalone discovered Allstate had a work-at-home policy, and again re-
quested to telecommute. Id. at 456. When Allstate denied his request, An-
zalone sued under the ADA, alleging that Allstate failed to reasonably ac-
commodate his disability. Id.
140. Id. at 459.
141. Id. at 458.
142. Id. Anzalone's home was located in the territory where he evaluated
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claims adjusters to work from home, thus undermining its con-
tention that the plaintiffs job required presence at the office. 143
On these grounds, the Anzalone court distinguished Vande
Zande and declined to adopt a presumption that telecommut-
ing is appropriate only in an extraordinary case.'4
II. A CRITIQUE OF THE PRESUMPTION APPROACHES
A. MISPLACED RELIANCE ON EXCESSIVE ABSENTEEISM
PRECEDENT
The presumption approach to evaluating telecommuting as
a reasonable accommodation rests on a shaky analytical foun-
dation. The Vande Zande and Whillock courts relied on exces-
sive absenteeism cases for the presumption that because vir-
tually all jobs require physical presence in the workplace,
telecommuting is rarely an appropriate accommodation.
145
Neither court, however, explained how the reasoning underly-
ing the excessive absenteeism cases applies in the telecommut-
ing context. Both courts state, as if it was a universal rule
applicable under all factual scenarios, that presence is an es-
sential function of employment.146
This reliance on excessive absenteeism cases for the
proposition that telecommuting is an unreasonable accommo-
dation is misplaced because of critical differences in the two
factual contexts. In a typical case involving disability-related
absenteeism, the issue is whether a court should require an
employer to accommodate a disabled employee's repeated, ex-
tended, and often unpredictable absences. 47 The reasoning in
claims, whereas the Allstate office was 50 miles away; thus, working at home
was arguably more efficient than working in the office. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544-45
(7th Cir. 1995) (citing excessive absenteeism cases for the assertion that most
jobs cannot be performed effectively at home); Whillock v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 926 F. Supp. 1555, 1564 (N.D. Ga. 1995), affd, 86 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir.
1996) (citing several absenteeism cases for the proposition that plaintiffs at-
tendance at work constitutes an "essential function of her job").
146. See Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 544-45 (citing two cases facing an absen-
teeism scenario in stating the "majority view," that telecommuting is gener-
ally an inappropriate accommodation); Whillock, 926 F. Supp. at 1564 (citing
several absenteeism cases for the proposition that a plaintiff who cannot come
to work cannot perform an essential function of her job).
147. See, e.g., Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs., Inc., 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th
Cir. 1991) (stating that plaintiffs frequent absences from school made it im-
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these cases focuses not on the plaintiff's physical presence at
work per se, but on the disruptions caused by the plaintiffs
unreliable job performance. 4 8 An examination of one case
cited by the Vande Zande and Whillock courts illustrates this
point. In Tyndall v. National Education Centers, Inc.,149 the
plaintiff never requested to work at home because her teaching
responsibilities could only be carried out on campus.151 In-
stead, Tyndall contended that her employer should not have
discharged her when her absences became frequent and un-
predictable.' 51 The court disagreed, however, and held that the
plaintiffs employer could not be compelled to continue to em-
ploy a teacher who did not show up for class. 152
While Tyndall was correctly decided, its reasoning does
not apply in the typical telecommuting case. In a Tyndall-type
case, adequate job performance and physical presence at work
are interrelated, either because the plaintiffs job cannot be
performed off premises or because the plaintiff is unable to
work with any regularity. In a typical telecommuting case,
however, the plaintiff argues that presence and performance
are not linked because performance can be achieved without
commuting to the office. 53 Determining whether or not the
plaintiff actually can achieve reliable performance by working
at home requires a factual inquiry into whether or not physical
presence at work is essential to the plaintiff's job. The re-
quired analysis cannot adequately be completed by resorting to
possible for her to function effectively as a teacher); Wimbley v. Bolger, 642 F.
Supp. 481, 485 (W.D. Tenn. 1986) (finding that a plaintiff terminated for re-
peated unscheduled absences could not reasonably be accommodated).
148. See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text (summarizing the
reasoning of courts facing excessive absenteeism cases).
149. 31 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 1994).
150. Id. at 213. Tyndall, who suffered from lupus, taught at a business
college; the school terminated her after she missed so many classes that other
teachers, who worked overtime to cover Tyndall's schedule, complained. Id. at
211-12.
151. Tyndall missed nearly 40 days of work in 7 months. Id. at 213. Tyn-
dall asserted that she should have been allowed additional time off to care for
an ailing son, after being provided with substantial leaves to deal with her
own health concerns. Id. at 211. Thus, the plaintiffs proposed accommoda-
tion did not enable her to regularly perform her job.
152. Id. at 213.
153. See, e.g., Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544
(7th Cir. 1995) (discussing plaintiffs request to telecommute so that she could
work full-time during her illness); Langon v. Department of Health & Human
Servs., 959 F.2d 1053, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citing plaintiffs request to work
at home in order to maintain full-time employment).
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a presumption that presence is essential because this pre-
sumes away the entire inquiry. By importing from the exces-
sive absenteeism cases a presumption that physical presence is
per se essential to employment, and that telecommuting is
thus by definition an inappropriate accommodation, the pre-
sumption cases confuse the need for physical presence at work
with the need for predictable job performance.
Thus, the Vande Zande court's assertion that excessive ab-
senteeism cases establish a presumption against compelling
employers to facilitate telecommuting for disabled workers is
simply incorrect. In fact, the Tyndall court explicitly acknowl-
edged that its holding would not apply in a case where a plain-
tiff could effectively perform her job from home.154 The only
presumption one can legitimately draw from the excessive ab-
senteeism cases is that reliable, predictable performance is an
essential function of most jobs. Because this is precisely what
a plaintiff who asks to telecommute seeks to achieve, excessive
absenteeism cases will often have little to contribute to an
analysis of telecommuting as a reasonable accommodation. 55
B. UNDERESTIMATING THE FEASIBILITY OF TELECOMMUTING
In addition to relying on excessive absenteeism cases, the
Vande Zande court also based its presumption against compel-
ling employers to facilitate telecommuting for disabled employ-
ees on the assumption that most jobs cannot be performed at
home without substantial reductions in productivity.156 The
court stated further that ongoing supervision of telecommuting
employees is virtually impossible. 15 7 Most research, however,
suggests that telecommuters are more productive than their in-
office counterparts.158 While the productivity gains or losses
achieved through telecommuting depend in part on the suit-
ability of the employee and the job requirements,5 9 this is a
fact-specific inquiry that courts can consider in evaluating a
154. Tyndall, 31 F.3d at 213.
155. See infra notes 203-205 and accompanying text (describing the limited
role excessive absenteeism cases should play in the telecommuting context).
156. See Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 545.
157. Id. The court does not offer any empirical evidence to support these
assumptions.
158. See supra note 82 (noting studies which found increased productivity
among telecommuting employees).
159. See supra notes 89, 93 and accompanying text (describing telecommu-
table jobs and traits of successful telecommuters).
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plaintiffs case. Likewise, while the supervision of telecommut-
ing employees presents unique challenges, 160 whether these
challenges and their accompanying costs rise to the level of
undue hardship 6' or render telecommuting facially unreason-
able in some employment settings162 is another fact-specific
question that cannot be answered by resorting to a broad pre-
sumption against telecommuting.
Although their analyses were less sweeping, the Carr and
Misek-Falkoff courts also underestimated the feasibility of tele-
commuting. In Carr, the court assumed that telecommuting is
an ineffective accommodation for jobs that have frequent and
inflexible deadlines. 63 The Misek-Falkoff court deemed tele-
commuting impractical in jobs requiring interaction with oth-
ers. " Unfortunately, neither court examined whether a tele-
commuting alternative could accomplish these functions. Given
the widespread availability of fax machines and e-mail trans-
mission,'65 the presence of deadlines bears little relationship to
the facial reasonableness of telecommuting. A coding clerk like
Carr, for example, could presumably enter data from home.1 66
Likewise, the need for collaboration may not preclude tele-
commuting because electronic or phone conferencing may en-
able a telecommuting employee to share ideas with col-
leagues. 67
The Vande Zande court acknowledges that a presumption
against telecommuting will be less tenable as technology ad-
160. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text (noting management
challenges raised by work-at-home arrangements).
161. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text (explaining the factors
which make a proposed accommodation an undue hardship).
162. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text (defining the "facially
reasonable" requirement).
163. See Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting that a
coding clerk could not work at home because her job involved tight deadlines).
The court repeated this assumption in Langon, suggesting that the employer
could prevail if it demonstrated that Langon's inability to comply with tight
deadlines imposed an undue hardship. Langon v. Department of Health &
Human Servs., 959 F.2d 1053, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
164. See Misek-Falkoff v. IBM, 854 F. Supp. 215, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1994),
affd, 60 F.3d 811 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining that an employer may require an
employee's presence "when interaction with others is essential to the task to
be performed").
165. See supra note 77 (noting the improving telecommunications technol-
ogy).
166. See NILLES, supra note 77, at 27 (listing the position of data entry
clerk as a job well-suited to full-time telecommuting).
167. See id. at 25 (describing available telecommunications technology).
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vances.'68 While this statement is accurate, the court erred in
assuming that current technologies are inadequate to support
work-at-home arrangements. Although telecommuting is not
yet widespread, neither is it the rarity the Vande Zande court
assumes. 69 Indeed, telecommuting has become more common
precisely because technologies have evolved to support it.
170
Unlike a presumption analysis, a fact-specific approach
requires courts to acknowledge technological change. Courts
using a fact-specific analysis will sometimes conclude that tele-
commuting is a reasonable option because some employees can
adequately work from home.' 7' Courts will not always reach
this conclusion, however, because telecommuting is effective
only in certain employment settings. 2 In either case, the final
decision under a fact-specific approach will reflect the actual
feasibility of telecommuting in a particular circumstance,
rather than rely on outdated and inaccurate assumptions.
C. DISREGARDING THE ADA's EMPHASIS ON INDIVIDUALIZED
INQUIRY
Not only is a fact-specific approach to telecommuting cases
more analytically sound, it is also the approach that the ADA
requires. When deciding reasonable accommodation cases, the
ADA directs courts to undertake a fact-specific inquiry that
balances employer and employee interests. 7 3 Courts that
adopt a presumption against telecommuting foreclose serious
inquiry into the reasonableness of telecommuting in particular
circumstances, however, because they assume that a plaintiff
168. See Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544 (7th
Cir. 1995) (predicting that technological advances will make telecommuting
more feasible).
169. See supra note 78 (surveying estimates of the current extent of tele-
commuting).
170. See supra note 77 (noting that the expansion of telecommuting coin-
cides with the development of affordable information technologies).
17L See supra note 89 and accompanying text (describing telecommutable
jobs).
172. See supra notes 89, 99 and accompanying text (explaining the limita-
tions and disadvantages of telecommuting).
173. The ADA provisions and EEOC regulations repeatedly refer to the
necessity of a fact-specific inquiry. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying
text (describing the fact-specific inquiry into essential job functions); supra
note 48 and accompanying text (discussing the interactive process required by
the EEOC to determine an appropriate reasonable accommodation); supra
notes 61-64 and accompanying text (explaining that the undue hardship
analysis requires a factual inquiry).
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who can only work from home is not qualified to perform an es-
sential function of his or her job.174  Under this analysis, a
plaintiff who cannot perform the essential function of coming to
work cannot meet a threshold element of his or her prima facie
case 17 because the protections of Title I apply only to qualified
individuals. 76 Consequently, the employee will not have any
meaningful opportunity to articulate why telecommuting is a
reasonable accommodation, nor will the employer be called
upon to defend its resistance to telecommuting. The required
balancing of employer and employee interests never occurs.
By failing to seriously examine the reasonableness of ei-
ther a plaintiffs claim that he or she can perform the job from
home, or a defendant's insistence that telecommuting is inap-
propriate, a presumption analysis hinders the case-by-case de-
velopment of reasonable accommodation standards envisioned
under the ADA. Any clarity achieved by the Vande Zande pre-
sumption against telecommuting is likely to be fleeting. As
telecommuting becomes increasingly common,177 a presumption
against work-at-home arrangements will be less tenable, and
courts will have to articulate factors for evaluating the reason-
ableness of telecommuting in individual cases.
While the presumption approach may reduce litigation, it
does so at the expense of the ADA's fundamental purpose,
which is to maximize employment opportunity for disabled
employees.17 Nothing in the ADA or its regulations suggests
that it would be appropriate to exclude an entire category of
accommodations from serious consideration. To the contrary,
the EEOC regulations explicitly state that the purpose of a
fact-specific approach is to allow disabled individuals to suc-
cessfully pursue a wide variety of employment opportunities. 79
To exclude from serious consideration an accommodation that
174. See supra notes 104-122 and accompanying text (describing the rea-
soning of courts using a presumption approach).
175. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (explaining that plaintiffs
bear the burden of demonstrating their job qualifications).
176. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (defining the scope of
coverage of Title I).
177. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (describing the increas-
ing prevalence of telecommuting).
178. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (describing the overall pur-
pose of the ADA); supra note 45 (explaining how the ADA seeks to achieve
equal opportunity for disabled individuals).
179. See supra text accompanying note 64 (explaining the purpose of a
fact-specific approach).
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is rapidly gaining acceptance in the mainstream American
workplace is fundamentally inconsistent with the ADA's ap-
proach to remedying employment discrimination.1 80 A fact-
specific analysis, on the other hand, furthers the goals of the
ADA and is consistent with the statute and the regulations.
D. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Judicial disapproval of telecommuting is also inconsistent
with Title rs fundamental purpose of increasing employment
opportunities for individuals with disabilities.18' Telecommut-
ing may be the only possible accommodation for individuals
who cannot regularly commute to work.182 Under a fact-specific
analysis, telecommuting can be implemented where it is ap-
propriate. Thus, the potential of telecommuting to increase the
employment of disabled individuals previously beyond the
reach of traditional accommodations can be realized under a
fact-specific approach. By contrast, a presumption approach
excludes a class of disabled workers from the protections of Ti-
tle I by treating physical presence at work as a prerequisite for
establishing qualifications for virtually all positions.' 83
A presumption against telecommuting is particularly inde-
fensible given the additional public policy advantages of work-
at-home arrangements. 18 4 Unlike other accommodations com-
pelled under the ADA, telecommuting has significant public
policy advantages, such as decreased traffic congestion and air
pollution,185 beyond the employment opportunities it facilitates
for disabled workers. Given these advantages, courts should
not underestimate telecommuting as an effective and practical
accommodation for disabled workers.
180. See supra notes 45, 48 and accompanying text (explaining the central-
ity of the reasonable accommodation requirement to the ADA's anti-
discrimination provisions and outlining the process for identifying an effective
accommodation).
18L See supra note 34 and accompanying text (describing the purpose of
Title I).
182. Langon and Vande Zande, for example, were both plaintiffs who could
have performed their jobs even though they could not commute.
183. See supra notes 104-122 and accompanying text (describing the pre-
sumption analysis).
184. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text (outlining the public
policy benefits of telecommuting).
185. See supra notes 86-87 (describing the estimated impact of telecom-
muting on traffic congestion and air pollution).
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III. A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING THE
REASONABLENESS OF TELECOMMUTING
This Note advocates a fact-specific approach to evaluating
whether telecommuting is a reasonable accommodation. Al-
though this was the approach of the Langon and Anzalone
courts, 186 neither court articulated in any detail the relevant
considerations or appropriate burdens of proof for assessing
telecommuting as a reasonable accommodation. This Note
provides a more explicit framework for a fact-specific analysis.
A. THE PLAINTIFF'S PRIMA FACIE CASE
Under the ADA, an employee has the initial burden of es-
tablishing his or her qualifications for the position in question,
including proposing any accommodations necessary to perform
essential job functions and establishing the reasonableness of
these accommodations.' In a telecommuting case, therefore, a
plaintiff must show that he or she can adequately perform es-
sential job responsibilities from home. The plaintiff must also
establish that telecommuting is facially reasonable. 188
In evaluating the plaintiffs showing, courts should not
presume that telecommuting is either reasonable or unreason-
able.1 89 Instead, courts should consider the nature of both the
plaintiffs responsibilities and the plaintiffs disability. 90 This
includes examining the need for the plaintiffs physical pres-
ence at work. If, for example, a plaintiffs job involves attend-
ing meetings, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she can
fully participate by phone or other electronic media. If regular
performance is essential to the job and the plaintiff has a his-
tory of absenteeism, the plaintiff must show that telecommut-
ing will facilitate predictable job performance.' 91 Alternatively,
186. See supra notes 135-144 and accompanying text (summarizing the
Langon andAnzalone opinions).
187. See supra notes 66-67, 70-76 and accompanying text (describing the
plaintiffs prima facie case).
188. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text (defining the "facially
reasonable" standard).
189. See supra notes 173-180 and accompanying text (explaining how a
presumption approach is incompatible with the fact-specific analysis required
under the ADA).
190. See supra notes 47, 49-50 and accompanying text (describing the gen-
eral characteristics of a reasonable accommodation).
191. Thus, even under a fact-specific approach telecommuting would not be
a reasonable accommodation for the plaintiff in Carr, who could not remedy
her absenteeism by telecommuting. See Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 529 (D.C.
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in either case the plaintiff may challenge the problematic job
criteria as nonessential, shifting the burden of proof to the de-
fendant to establish the essential functions of the position.
192
Once a plaintiff demonstrates that he or she can perform
the job from home, a court should then require the plaintiff to
demonstrate that telecommuting is not so disproportionately
expensive or impractical as to be obviously inappropriate for
employers in the industry.'93 While this showing of facial rea-
sonableness need not be extensive, it can serve to mitigate the
"wild goose chase"194 effect inherent in a case-specific inquiry,
by imposing a reasonable evidentiary hurdle in the path of a
plaintiff for whom telecommuting is clearly inappropriate.
B. EMPLOYER DEFENSES UNDER A FACT-SPECIFIC APPROACH
In a reasonable accommodation case, the employer carries
the burden of establishing the essential job functions. 195 Be-
cause telecommuting may be a limited solution in some cases,1 96
an employer will sometimes be able to prove that physical
presence is an essential function, thus precluding telecommut-
ing as a potential accommodation.1 97 Persuasive evidence
might include the need for ongoing supervision,198 the impos-
sibility of effective collaboration with clients or colleagues other
Cir. 1994) (stating that the plaintiff failed to show that by working at home
she could remedy her absenteeism).
192. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (explaining that the defen-
dant must prove the essential nature of any contested function).
193. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text (describing the plain-
tiffs burden to show the facial reasonableness of a proposed accommodation).
194. See Carr, 23 F.3d at 530 (cautioning that the district courts should
not transform the individualized inquiry envisioned by the Rehab Act into a
"pro forma wild goose chase").
195. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (noting that the defendant
must prove the essential nature of any contested job function).
196. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text (describing the limita-
tions of telecommuting for both employers and employees).
197. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (explaining that the ADA
does not require employers to implement an accommodation that allows an
employee to perform all essential fimctions of his or her position).
198. See supra note 117 (identifying the need for personal supervision as
one reason for the Whillock court's decision not to sanction telecommuting as
a reasonable accommodation).
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than in person, 199 or the centrality of the employer's facilities
for the conduct of day-to-day operations. 200
Even if physical presence is not an essential function of the
plaintiffs employment, an employer may still demonstrate that
the plaintiff cannot adequately perform a job by telecommut-
ing. For example, an employer might show that the plaintiff
has not demonstrated the ability to work independently, which
is often critical to the success of telecommuting arrange-
ments.20' This defense is also appropriate where a plaintiff has
a history of prolonged and unpredictable absenteeism unre-
lated to the need to commute to work.20 2
When continued absenteeism is an issue, an employer may
draw on excessive absenteeism precedent for the proposition
that a plaintiff who cannot reliably perform a job is not quali-
fied for purposes of the ADA.2 °3 In evaluating this argument,
however, courts should adhere to a fact-specific analysis rather
than presume that regularity is essential.2° For example, if, as
in Langon, the plaintiff can show that by conserving the energy
used in commuting he or she can achieve reliable job perform-
ance,20 5 a court may find this justification persuasive even if
the plaintiff has a prior history of absenteeism from work.
This analysis recognizes that telecommuting may facilitate job
performance in cases where other accommodations have proved
unworkable, while also acknowledging that the chronically ab-
sent employee may indeed be unable to function effectively in
many work environments.
199. See supra notes 129, 131 (explaining that the Misek-Falkoff court found
the need for collaboration with others inconsistent with telecommuting).
200. See Piskurich, supra note 78, at 24 (listing dependence on an em-
ployer's equipment as a barrier to telecommuting).
201. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (identifying characteristics
of successful telecommuters).
202. See, e.g., Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (explaining
that because "[w]ith or without reasonable accommodation, Ms. Carr's per-
formance since 1984 showed that she would not be able to work regular
hours," there was no need for an individualized inquiry into various forms of
accommodation).
203. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning
of the excessive absenteeism cases).
204. See supra notes 173-180 and accompanying text (arguing that the
ADA requires a fact-specific approach that precludes the use of a presumption
analysis).
205. Langon v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 959 F.2d 1053,
1055 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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If the employer fails to prove either that presence is es-
sential or that the plaintiff is not qualified for the job, an em-
ployer may still prevail by proving that telecommuting imposes
an undue hardship. An employer bears the burden of persua-
sion on this defense, however,0 6 and must prove that telecom-
muting is either unworkable or too expensive.2 7 For example,
telecommuting might be unworkable if a small employer
proves that its ability to meet flexible business demands will be
severely diminished if one of its employees is unavailable on
short notice. The question of when the cost of an accommoda-
tion renders it an undue hardship requires a fact-specific in-
quiry focusing on the employer's financial resources.0 8 Under
the EEOC regulations, however, an employee committed to
telecommuting may be able to defeat a cost-based defense f he
or she is willing to share the expenses with the employer.0 9
C. ENFORCING THE INTERACTIVE PROCESS
The obvious disadvantage of a fact-specific approach to
reasonable accommodation analysis is that it encourages liti-
gation. One way for courts to minimize this result is to insist
that both parties prove their good faith participation in an in-
teractive process to determine a workable accommodation. 210
In addition to its efficiency advantages, insisting on meaning-
ful interaction encourages the compromise and negotiation un-
derlying the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement.2 '
Where an interactive process results in the identification
of an appropriate accommodation, the ADA's purposes are
achieved while litigation is avoided. By contrast, under a pre-
206. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (explaining that the em-
ployer bears the burden of proving undue hardship).
207. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text (describing the undue
hardship defense).
208. Neither the ADA nor the EEOC regulations provide any guidance as
to the scope of an employer's financial obligations under the ADA's reasonable
accommodation provisions. For an extended analysis of an employer's finan-
cial obligations under Title I of the ADA, see generally Epstein, supra note 63
(criticizing the vagueness of the undue hardship standard).
209. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(p) (1996) (providing that if an accommo-
dation is unduly expensive, the employee should be allowed either to provide
the accommodation or to pay a portion of the cost).
210. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (describing the interactive
process required of employers and employees under the EEOC regulations).
211 See supra note 48 (summarizing the process aspects of the reasonable
accommodation requirement).
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sumption approach, litigation is reduced but the ADA's pur-
poses may be thwarted.212 Ideally, a fact-specific approach to
adjudicating telecommuting cases should produce an outcome
similar to what good faith negotiations would achieve, because
both processes focus on the realities and limitations of tele-
commuting in particular cases.
CONCLUSION
The increasing prevalence of telecommuting in the Ameri-
can workplace confirms its potential as an accommodation for
disabled employees. As telecommuting becomes more common,
its possibilities and limitations as a reasonable accommodation
will be more fully understood. This in turn should make it
easier for courts to assess the reasonableness of telecommuting
in particular settings, while decreasing employer resistance to
telecommuting in circumstances where it is appropriate.
In the future, courts considering telecommuting as a rea-
sonable accommodation should abandon the presumption
analysis and undertake the fact-specific inquiry Congress in-
tended. Properly implemented, a fact-specific approach takes
employer objections to telecommuting seriously, while ac-
knowledging that the realities of technological advancement
make telecommuting more feasible than commonly assumed.
Most importantly, a fact-specific analysis of telecommuting as
a reasonable accommodation advances the overriding objective
of the ADA, by facilitating additional employment opportuni-
ties for disabled workers.
212. See supra notes 178-180, 181-183 and accompanying text (arguing
that the presumption approach undermines the purposes of the ADA).
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